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Signal state preparation in quantum key distribution schemes can be realized using either an
active or a passive source. Passive sources might be valuable in some scenarios; for instance, in
those experimental setups operating at high transmission rates, since no externally driven element
is required. Typical passive transmitters involve parametric down-conversion. More recently, it has
been shown that phase-randomized coherent pulses also allow passive generation of decoy states
and Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) polarization signals, though the combination of both setups in
a single passive source is cumbersome. In this paper, we present a complete passive transmitter
that prepares decoy-state BB84 signals using coherent light. Our method employs sum-frequency
generation together with linear optical components and classical photodetectors. In the asymptotic
limit of an infinite long experiment, the resulting secret key rate (per pulse) is comparable to the
one delivered by an active decoy-state BB84 setup with an infinite number of decoy settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is already a mature
technology that can provide cryptographic systems with
an unprecedented level of security [1]. It aims at the
distribution of a secret key between two distant parties
(typically called Alice and Bob) despite the technologi-
cal power of an eavesdropper (Eve) who interferes with
the signals. This secret key is the essential ingredient of
the one-time-pad or Vernam cipher [2], the only known
encryption method that can offer information-theoretic
secure communications.
Most practical long-distance implementations of QKD
are based on the so-called BB84 protocol, introduced
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [3], in combination
with the decoy-state method [4–8]. In a typical quan-
tum optical implementation of this scheme, Alice sends
to Bob phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs)
with different mean photon numbers that are selected, in-
dependently and randomly, for each signal. These states
can be generated using a standard semiconductor laser
together with a variable optical attenuator that is con-
trolled by a random number generator (RNG) [9]. Each
light pulse may be prepared in a different polarization
state, which is selected, again independently and ran-
domly for each signal, between two mutually unbiased
bases, e.g., either a linear (H [horizontal] or V [vertical])
or a circular (L [left] or R [right]) polarizations basis [10].
For that, two main experimental configurations are typ-
ically used. In the first one, Alice employs four laser
diodes, one for each possible BB84 signal [11]. These
lasers are controlled by a RNG that decides each given
time which one of the four diodes is triggered. The second
configuration utilizes only one laser diode in combination
with a polarization modulator [12]. This modulator ro-
tates the state of polarization of the signals depending
on the output of a RNG. On the receiving side, Bob
measures each incoming signal by choosing at random
between two polarization analyzers, one for each possi-
ble basis. Once the quantum communication phase of
the protocol is completed, Alice and Bob use an authen-
ticated public channel to process their data and obtain
a secure secret key. This last procedure, called key dis-
tillation, involves, generally, local randomization, error
correction to reconcile Alice’s and Bob’s data, and pri-
vacy amplication to decouple their data from Eve [13]. A
full proof of the security for the decoy-state BB84 QKD
protocol with WCPs has been given in Refs. [5–7].
Alternatively to the active signal state preparation
methods described above, Alice may as well employ a
passive transmitter to generate decoy-state BB84 signal
states. This last solution might be desirable in some
scenarios; for instance, in those experimental setups op-
erating at high transmission rates, since no RNGs are
required in a passive device [14–19]. Passive schemes
could also be more robust against side-channel attacks
hidden in the imperfections of the optical components
than active sources. The working principle of a passive
transmitter is rather simple. For example, Alice can use
various light sources to produce different signal states
that are sent through an optics network. Depending
on the detection pattern observed in some properly lo-
cated photodetectors, she can infer which signal states
are actually generated. Known passive schemes rely typ-
ically on the use of a parametric down-conversion (PDC)
source, where Alice and Bob passively and randomly
choose which bases to measure each incoming pulse by
means of a beamsplitter (BS) [19]. Also, Alice can ex-
ploit the photon number correlations that exist between
the two output modes of a PDC source to passively gen-
erate decoy states [15]. More recently, it has been shown
that phase-randomized coherent pulses are also suitable
for passive preparation of decoy states [16, 17] and BB84
polarization signals [20], though the combination of both
setups in a single passive source is cumbersome. Intu-
itively speaking, Refs. [16, 17, 20] take advantage of the
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FIG. 1. Basic setup of a passive decoy-state BB84 QKD
source with polarization encoding using phase-randomized
strong coherent pulses. The mean photon number of the sig-
nal states ρi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, can be chosen very high;
for instance, ≈ 108 photons. BS denotes a beamsplitter, PBS
represents a polarizing beamsplitter in the ±45◦ linear polar-
ization basis [25], F is an optical filter, R denotes a polariza-
tion rotator changing +45◦ linear polarization to −45◦ linear
polarization, |vac〉 represents the vacuum state, and t denotes
the transmittance of a BS; it satisfies t≪ 1.
random phase of the different incoming pulses to pas-
sively generate states with either distinct photon number
statistics but with the same polarization [16, 17], or with
different polarizations but equal intensities [20].
In this article, we present a complete passive transmit-
ter for QKD that can prepare decoy-state BB84 signal
states using coherent light. Our method employs sum-
frequency generation (SFG) [21, 22] together with linear
optical components and classical photodetectors. SFG
has already exhibited its usefulness in quantum informa-
tion [23] and device-independent QKD [24] at the single-
photon level. Here we use it in the conventional non-
linear optics paradigm with strong coherent light. This
fact might render our proposal particularly valuable from
an experimental point of view. In the asymptotic limit
of an infinite long experiment, it turns out that the se-
cret key rate (per pulse) provided by such passive scheme
is similar to the one delivered by an active decoy-state
BB84 setup with infinite decoy settings.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we
introduce a passive transmitter that generates decoy-
state BB84 polarization signal states using coherent light.
Then, in Sec. III we evaluate its performance and we ob-
tain a lower bound on the resulting secret key rate. In
Sec. IV we consider the case where Alice and Bob use
phase-encoding, which is more suitable to employ in com-
bination with optical fibers than polarization encoding.
Finally, Sec. V concludes the article with a summary.
The paper includes as well some Appendixes with addi-
tional calculations.
II. PASSIVE DECOY-STATE BB84
TRANSMITTER
The basic setup is illustrated in Fig. 1. Let us start
considering, for simplicity, the interference of two pure
coherent states of frequency w1, both prepared in +45
◦
linear polarization and with arbitrary phase relationship,
|√2µeiθ1〉a0,+45◦ and |
√
2µeiθ2〉b0,+45◦ , at a 50 : 50 BS.
The output states in modes a1 and b1 are given by
|√µ(eiθ1 + eiθ2)〉
a1,+45◦
⊗ |√µ(eiθ1 − eiθ2)〉
b1,+45◦
. (1)
Then, we have that the output states in modes c1 and d1
have the form
|√µ2 (eiθ1 + eiθ2)〉c1,+45◦ ⊗ |√µ2 (eiθ1 + eiθ2)〉d1,+45◦ . (2)
If these two states are combined with two coherent states
of frequency w2, |√µeiθ3〉a2,+45◦ and |
√
µeiθ4〉
b2,+45◦
, in
a nonlinear medium using the SFG process, the resulting
output states at frequency w3 = w1+w2, after the polar-
ization rotation R, can be written as (see Appendix A)
|−
√
µeiθ3 (eiθ1+eiθ2 )√
2
〉
c2,+45◦
⊗ |−
√
µeiθ4 (eiθ1+eiθ2 )√
2
〉
d2,−45◦
.
(3)
These two beams are now re-combined at a PBS in the
±45◦ linear polarization basis [25]. We obtain that the
output state in mode a3 (see Fig. 1) is a coherent state
of the form
|
√
ζ(θ)eiφ〉ψ,a3 = e
−ζ(θ)/2
∞∑
n=0
(√
ζ(θ)eiφ
)n
√
n!
|nψ〉, (4)
where ζ(θ) = 2µ(1 + cos θ), θ = θ2 − θ1, φ = π + θ1 +
θ3 + arg (1 + e
iθ), and the Fock states |nψ〉 are given by
|nψ〉 =
[ 1√
2
(a†+45◦ + e
iψa†−45◦)]
n
√
n!
|vac〉, (5)
with |vac〉 denoting the vacuum state and ψ = θ4 − θ3.
Finally, Alice sends the quantum state given by Eq. (4)
through a BS of transmittance t ≪ 1. Then, the output
states in modes c3 and d3 are given by
|
√
tζ(θ)eiφ〉ψ,c3 ⊗ |
√
(1− t)ζ(θ)eiφ〉ψ,d3 . (6)
The analysis of the case where the global phase of
each input signal ρi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, is random-
ized and inaccessible to the eavesdropper is now straight-
forward. It can be solved by just integrating the sig-
nals |
√
tζ(θ)eiφ〉ψ,c3 and |
√
(1− t)ζ(θ)eiφ〉ψ,d3 given by
Eq. (6) over all angles θ, φ, and ψ. In particular, we have
that the output state σ in this scenario (see Fig. 1) can
be written as
σ =
1
(2π)3
∫∫∫
φ,θ,ψ
|
√
tζ(θ)eiφ〉
ψ,c3
〈
√
tζ(θ)eiφ| dφdθdψ
=
1
(2π)2
∫
θ
e−γ(θ)
∞∑
n=0
γ(θ)n
n!
∫
ψ
|nψ〉〈nψ | dθdψ, (7)
where the intensity γ(θ) is given by γ(θ) = tζ(θ).
3The weak intensity signal σ in mode c3 is suitable for
QKD and Alice sends it to Bob through the quantum
channel. Also, she uses the strong intensity signal avail-
able in mode d3 to measure both its intensity and po-
larization. This last measurement can be realized, for
example, by means of a passive BB84 detection scheme
where the basis choice is performed by a 50 : 50 BS, and
on each end there is a PBS and two classical photodetec-
tors. From the different intensities observed in each of
these four photodetectors, Alice can determine both the
value of the angle ψ and the total intensity of the signal.
Note that, by assumption, we have that the intensity of
the input states ρi is very high.
For simplicity, let us assume for the moment that
the polarization measurement is perfect, i.e., for each
incoming signal it provides Alice with a precise value
for the measured angle ψ, while the intensity measure-
ment only tells her whether the measured intensity is
below or above a certain threshold value Λ that satisfies
0 < Λ < 4µ(1 − t). That is, Λ is between the minimal
and maximal possible values of the intensity (1 − t)ζ(θ)
of the optical pulses in mode d3. The first intensity in-
terval, ξd = [0,Λ], can be associated, for instance, to the
generation of a decoy state in output mode c3 (that we
shall denote as σd), while the second intensity interval,
ξs = [Λ, 4µ(1 − t)], corresponds to the case of preparing
a signal state (σs). Note, however, that the analysis pre-
sented in this section can be straightforwardly adapted
to cover as well the case of several intensity intervals ξi
(i.e., the generation of several decoy states). Figure 2
(case A) shows a graphical representation of the intensity
(1 − t)ζ(θ) in mode d3 versus the angle θ, together with
the threshold value Λ and the intensity intervals ξd and
ξs. The threshold angle θΛ that satisfies (1− t)ζ(θΛ) = Λ
is given by
θΛ = arccos
(
Λ
2µ(1− t) − 1
)
. (8)
In this simplified scenario, the conditional quantum
states that are sent to Bob can be written as
σi,ψ =
∞∑
n=0
pin|nψ〉〈nψ |, (9)
where i = {s, d}, and the probabilities pin are given by
psn =
1
θΛ
∫ θΛ
0
e−γ(θ)
γ(θ)n
n!
dθ,
pdn =
1
π − θΛ
∫ pi
θΛ
e−γ(θ)
γ(θ)n
n!
dθ. (10)
In practice, however, it is not necessary that Alice de-
termines the value of ψ accurately and restricts herself
to only those events where she actually prepares a per-
fect BB84 polarization state (i.e., when the angle ψ sat-
isfies ψ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}) [20]. Note that the proba-
bility associated with these ideal events tends to zero.
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FIG. 2. (Case A) Graphical representation of the intensity
(1 − t)ζ(θ) in mode d3 (see Fig. 1) versus the angle θ. Λ
represents the threshold value of the classical intensity mea-
surement, θΛ is its associated threshold angle, and ξd and ξs
denote the resulting intensity intervals. (Case B) Graphical
representation of the valid regions for the angle ψ. These
regions are marked in gray. They depend on an acceptance
parameter Ω ∈ [0, π/4].
Instead, it is sufficient if the polarization measurement
tells her the value of ψ within a certain interval around
the desired ideal values. This situation is illustrated in
Fig. 2 (case B), where Alice selects some valid regions
(marked with gray color in the figure) for the angle ψ
[20]. These regions depend on an acceptance parameter
Ω ∈ [0, π/4] that we optimize. In particular, whenever
the value of ψ lies within any of the valid regions, Alice
considers the pulse emitted by the source as a valid sig-
nal. Otherwise, the pulse is discarded afterwards during
the post-processing phase of the protocol, and it does not
contribute to the key rate. The probability that a pulse
is accepted, pacc, is given by
pacc = 1− 4Ω
π
. (11)
There is a trade-off on the acceptance parameter Ω.
A high acceptance probability pacc favors Ω ≈ 0, but
this action also results in an increase of the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) of the protocol. A low QBER favors
Ω ≈ π/4, but then pacc ≈ 0. Note that in the limit where
Ω tends to π/4 we recover the standard decoy-state BB84
protocol.
4III. LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRET KEY
RATE
We shall consider that Alice and Bob treat decoy and
signal states separately, and they distill secret key from
both of them. For that, we use the security analysis
presented in Ref. [5], which combines the results pro-
vided by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) in
Ref. [27] (see also Ref. [28]) with the decoy-state method
[29]. The secret key rate formula can be written as
R ≥
∑
i
pi max{Ri, 0}, (12)
with i = {s, d}. Here pi denotes the probability to gen-
erate a state associated to the intensity interval ξi (i.e.,
ps = θΛ/π and pd = 1− ps), and
Ri ≥ qpacc
{−Qif(Ei)H(Ei) + pi1Y1[1−H(e1)]
+ pi0Y0
}
. (13)
The parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol (q = 1/2
for the standard BB84 scheme, and q ≈ 1 for its efficient
version [30]); Qi denotes the gain, i.e., the probability
that Bob obtains a click in his measurement apparatus
when Alice sends him a signal σi; f(E
i) represents the
efficiency of the error correction protocol as a function of
the error rate Ei, typically f(Ei) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit
f(Ei) = 1 [31]; Yn is the yield of an n-photon signal, i.e.,
the conditional probability of a detection event on Bob’s
side given that Alice transmits an n-photon state; en
denotes the error rate of an n-photon signal; and H(x) =
−x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) represents the binary
Shannon entropy function.
For simulation purposes, we shall consider a simple
channel model in the absence of eavesdropping [5, 7]; it
just consists of a BS whose transmittance depends on the
transmission distance and the loss coefficient of the quan-
tum channel. That is, for simplicity, we neglect any mis-
alignment effect in the channel. Furthermore, we assume
that Bob employs an active BB84 detection setup. This
model allows us to calculate the observed experimental
parameters Qi and Ei. These quantities are given in
Appendix B. Our results, however, can also be straight-
forwardly applied to any other quantum channel or de-
tection setup, as they depend only on the observed gain
and QBER.
To evaluate the secret key rate formula given by
Eq. (13) we need to estimate the yields Y0 and Y1, to-
gether with the single-photon error rate e1, by solving
the following set of linear equations:
Qi =
∞∑
n=0
pinYn, and Q
iEi =
∞∑
n=0
pinYnen. (14)
For that, we shall use the procedure proposed in Refs. [7,
17]. Moreover, we will assume a random background
(i.e., e0 = 1/2). This method requires that the prob-
abilities pin given by Eq. (10) satisfy certain conditions
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FIG. 3. Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (12) in logarithmic scale for the passive transmitter with
two intensity settings illustrated in Fig. 1 (green line). For
simulation purposes, we consider the following experimen-
tal parameters: the dark count rate of Bob’s detectors is
ǫB = 3.2× 10−7, the overall transmittance of Bob’s detection
apparatus is ηB = 0.045, the loss coefficient of the channel
is α = 0.2 dB/km, q = 1/2, and the efficiency of the error
correction protocol is f(Ei) = 1.22. We further assume the
channel model described in Refs. [5, 7], where we neglect any
misalignment effect. Otherwise, the actual secure distance
will be smaller. The inset figure shows the value for the op-
timized parameters µt (dashed line) and Ω (solid line) in the
passive setup. The optimal value for the threshold parameter
Λ turns out to be constant with the distance and equal to
2µ(1− t), i.e., the threshold angle θΛ satisfies θΛ = π/2. The
black line represents a lower bound on R for an active asymp-
totic decoy-state BB84 system with infinite decoy settings [5],
while the red line shows the case of a passive transmitter with
infinite intensity intervals ξi (see Appendix D).
that we confirm numerically. The results are included
in Appendix C. It is important to emphasize, however,
that the estimation technique presented in Refs. [7, 17]
only constitutes a possible example of a finite setting es-
timation procedure. In principle, many other estimation
methods are also available for this purpose, such as linear
programming tools [32], which might result in sharper, or
for the purpose of QKD, better bounds on the considered
probabilities.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate with
two intensity settings is illustrated in Fig. 3 (green line).
In our simulation we employ the following experimental
parameters: the dark count rate of Bob’s detectors is
ǫB = 3.2 × 10−7, the overall transmittance of Bob’s de-
tection apparatus is ηB = 0.045, and the loss coefficient
of the channel is α = 0.2 dB/km. We further assume that
q = 1/2, and f(Ei) = 1.22. With this configuration, it
turns out that the optimal value of the parameter µt de-
creases with increasing distance, while the optimal value
of the parameter Ω increases with the distance. A similar
behavior was also observed in the passive BB84 trans-
mitter (without decoy states) proposed in Ref. [20]. In
5particular, µt diminishes from ≈ 0.175 to ≈ 0.125, while
Ω augments from ≈ 0.393 to ≈ 0.7. At long distances the
gain of the protocol is very low and, therefore, it is im-
portant to keep both the multi-photon probability of the
source (related with the parameter µt) and the intrinsic
error rate of the signals sent by Alice (related with the
parameter Ω) also low. Figure 3 includes as well an inset
plot with the optimized parameters µt (dashed line) and
Ω (solid line). The optimal value for the parameter Λ
turns out to be constant with the distance; it is given by
Λ = 2µ(1−t), i.e., the threshold angle θΛ is equal to π/2.
This figure also shows a lower bound on the secret key
rate for the cases of an active decoy-state BB84 system
with infinite decoy settings (black line) [5], and a passive
transmitter with infinite intensity intervals ξi (red line).
The cutoff points where the secret key rate drops down
to zero are ≈ 181 km (passive setup with two intensity
settings), ≈ 183 km (passive setup with infinite intensity
settings), and ≈ 192 km (active transmitter with infi-
nite decoy settings). From the results shown in Fig. 3
we see that the performance of the passive transmitter
presented in Sec. II, with only two intensity settings, is
similar to that of an active asymptotic setup, thus show-
ing the practical interest of the passive scheme. The rel-
atively small difference between the achievable secret key
rates in both scenarios is due to two main factors: (a) the
intrinsic error rate of the signals accepted by Alice, which
is zero only in the case of an active source, and (b) the
probability pacc to accept a pulse emitted by the source,
which is pacc < 1 in the passive setup and pacc = 1 in
the active scheme. For instance, we have that for most
distances Ω ≈ 0.393, which implies pacc ≈ 0.5. This fact
reduces the key rate on logarithmic scale of the passive
transmitter by a factor of log10 pacc ≈ 0.3. The addi-
tional factor of ≈ 0.45 that can be observed in Fig. 3
arises mainly from the intrinsic error rate of the signals.
IV. PHASE ENCODING
Similar ideas to the ones presented in Sec. II can also be
used in other implementations of the decoy-state BB84
protocol with a different signal encoding. For instance, in
those QKD experiments based on phase encoding, which
is more suitable to use with optical fibers than polariza-
tion encoding, which is particularly relevant in the con-
text of free-space QKD [1].
The basic setup is illustrated in Fig. 4. Again, for
simplicity, let us consider first the case where the input
signals ρi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, are pure coherent states
with arbitrary phase relationship: |√2µeiθ1〉a0,+45◦ and
|√2µeiθ2〉b0,+45◦ (of frequency w1), and |
√
µeiθ3〉
a2,+45◦
and |√µeiθ4〉
b2,+45◦
(of frequency w2). Let ∆t denote the
time difference between two consecutive pulses generated
by the sources. Then, from Sec. II we have that the
signals in modes c2 and d2 at time instances t and t+∆t/2
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FIG. 4. Basic setup of a passive decoy-state BB84 QKD
source with phase encoding. The delay introduced by one
arm of the interferometer is equal to half the time difference
∆t between two consecutive pulses.
can be written as
|
√
ζ(θ)
2 e
iφ〉
t
c2,+45◦
⊗ |
√
ζ(θ)
2 e
iφ′〉
t+∆t/2
d2,+45◦
, (15)
where φ′ = φ+ θ4− θ3. Similarly, we find that the quan-
tum states in modes c3 and d3 are given by, respectively,
|
√
γ(θ)
2 e
iφ〉
t
c3,+45◦
⊗ |
√
γ(θ)
2 e
iφ′〉
t+∆t/2
c3,+45◦
,
|
√
ζ(θ)
2 e
iφ〉
t
d3,+45◦
⊗ |
√
ζ(θ)
2 e
iφ′〉
t+∆t/2
d3,+45◦
. (16)
The case of phase-randomized strong coherent pulses
is completely analogous to that of Sec. II and we omit it
here for simplicity; it results in an uniform distribution
for the angles θ, φ, and φ′ for both pairs of pulses given
by Eq. (16). The strong signals in mode d3 are used to
measure both their phases, relative to some local refer-
ence phase, and their intensities by means of an intensity
and phase measurement, while Alice sends the weak sig-
nals in mode c3 to Bob. Again, just like in the passive
source with polarization encoding shown in Fig. 1, Alice
can now select some valid regions for the measured phases
and also distinguish between different intensity settings.
Then, we have that the analysis and results presented in
Sec. III also apply straightforwardly to this scenario.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a complete pas-
sive transmitter for QKD that can prepare decoy-state
Bennett-Brassard 1984 signal states using coherent light.
Our method employs sum-frequency generation together
with linear optical components and classical photode-
tectors, and constitutes an alternative to those active
sources that are typically used in current experimental
realizations of QKD. In the asymptotic limit of an infi-
nite long experiment, we have proven that such passive
scheme can provide a secret key rate (per pulse) similar
to the one delivered by an active decoy-state BB84 setup
with infinite decoy settings, thus showing the practical
interest of the passive scheme.
6The main focus of this paper has been polarization-
based realizations of the BB84 protocol, which are par-
ticularly relevant for free-space QKD. However, we have
also shown that similar ideas can as well be applied to
other practical scenarios with different signal encodings,
like, for instance, those QKD experiments based on phase
encoding, which are more suitable for use in combination
with optical fibers.
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Appendix A: Sum-frequency generation
For completeness, in this Appendix we include the
calculations to derive Eq. (3) in Sec. II. Our starting
point are the input states to one of the two SFG pro-
cesses used in the passive transmitter illustrated in Fig. 1:
|√µ2 (eiθ1 + eiθ2)〉c1,+45◦ and |√µeiθ3〉a2,+45◦ . Such pro-
cess is described by the Hamiltonian H = i~χ(c1a2c
†
2 −
H.c.), where c†2 represents the creation operator for the
light wave at frequency w3 = w1 + w2 [22]. The pa-
rameter χ is a coupling constant that is proportional to
the second-order susceptibility χ(2) of the nonlinear ma-
terial, and H.c. denotes a Hermitian conjugate. When
the pump mode at frequency w2 is kept strong and unde-
pleted, then this mode can be typically treated classically
as a complex number. With this assumption, we have
that the effective Hamiltonian above can now be written
as H = i~χ(
√
µeiθ3c1c
†
2 − H.c.). Using the Heisenberg
equation of motion, it is straightforward to obtain the
following coupled-mode equations:
dc1
dt
= −χ√µe−iθ3c2, dc2
dt
= χ
√
µeiθ3c1, (A1)
which can be solved in terms of initial values at t = 0 to
yield
c1(t) = c1(0) cos (
√
µχt)− e−iθ3c2(0) sin (√µχt)
c2(t) = c2(0) cos (
√
µχt) + eiθ3c1(0) sin (
√
µχt). (A2)
At the point of complete conversion, tc = π/(2
√
µχ), we
obtain
c†1(tc) = −eiθ3c†2(0), c†2(tc) = e−iθ3c†1(0). (A3)
That is, at time tc we find that the resulting output state
at frequency w3 from the SFG process is given by
| −√µ2 eiθ3(eiθ1 + eiθ2)〉c2,+45◦ . (A4)
Appendix B: Gain and QBER
In this Appendix, we obtain a mathematical expres-
sion for the observed gains Qi and error rates Ei, with
i ∈ {s, d}, for the passive QKD transmitter with two
intensity settings introduced in Sec. II. For that, we em-
ploy the typical channel model in the absence of eaves-
dropping [5, 7]; it just consists of a BS of transmittance
ηchannel = 10
−αd
10 , where α denotes the loss coefficient of
the channel measured in dB/km and d is the transmis-
sion distance. Moreover, for simplicity, we consider that
Bob employs an active BB84 detection setup with two
threshold detectors.
The action of Bob’s measurement device can be
described by two positive operator value measures
(POVMs), one for each of the two BB84 polarization
bases β ∈ {l, c}, with l denoting a linear polarization
basis and c a circular polarization basis. Each POVM
contains four elements: Gβvac, G
β
0 , G
β
1 , and G
β
dc. The
first one corresponds to the case of no click in the detec-
tors, the following two POVM operators give precisely
one detection click, and the last one, Gβdc, gives rise to
both detectors being triggered. These operators can be
written as [20]
Gβvac = [1− ǫB(2− ǫB)]F βvac,
Gβ0 = (1 − ǫB)ǫBF βvac + (1 − ǫB)F β0 ,
Gβ1 = (1 − ǫB)ǫBF βvac + (1 − ǫB)F β1 ,
Gβdc = 1 −Gβvac −Gβ0 −Gβ1 . (B1)
Here we assume that the background rate is, to a
good approximation, independent of the signal detec-
tion. Moreover, for easiness of notation, we consider only
a background contribution coming from the dark count
rate ǫB of Bob’s detectors and we neglect other back-
ground contributions like, for instance, stray light arising
from timing pulses which are not completely filtered out
in reception. The operators F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
dc have
the form
F βvac =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− ηsys)n+m|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)n](1− ηsys)m|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β1 =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)m](1− ηsys)n|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F βdc =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)n][1− (1− ηsys)m]
× |n,m〉β〈n,m|, (B2)
7with β ∈ {l, c}. The signals |n,m〉l (|n,m〉c) represent
the state which has n photons in the horizontal (circu-
lar left) polarization mode and m photons in the vertical
(circular right) polarization mode. The parameter ηsys
denotes the overall transmittance of the system. This
quantity can be written as ηsys = ηBηchannel, where ηB is
the overall transmittance of Bob’s detection apparatus,
i.e., it includes the transmittance of any optical compo-
nent within Bob’s measurement device together with the
efficiency of his detectors.
In the scenario considered, it turns out that the gains
Qi are independent of the actual polarization of the sig-
nals σi,ψ given by Eq. (9) and the basis β used to measure
them. We obtain
Qi = 1− Tr(Gβvacσi,ψ)
= 1− (1− ǫB)
2
piπ
∫
θξi
e−ηsysγ(θ) dθ, (B3)
where ps = θΛ/π, pd = 1 − ps, θξs = [0, θΛ], and θξd =
[θΛ, π].
When θΛ = π/2, which is the value that maximizes the
secret key rate formula given by Eq. (12), we have that
the gains Qi can be written as
Qs = 1− (1− ǫB)2A−(ηsysζ),
Qd = 1− (1− ǫB)2A+(ηsysζ), (B4)
where ζ = 2µt, and
A±(x) = e−x
[
I0,x ± L0,x
]
. (B5)
Here Iq,z represents the modified Bessel function of the
first kind, and Lq,z denotes the modified Struve function.
These functions are defined as [33]
Iq,z =
1
2πi
∮
e(z/2)(t+1/t)t−q−1dt, (B6)
Lq,z =
zq
2q−1
√
πΓq+1/2
∫ pi/2
0
sinh (z cos θ) sin θ2qdθ.
The error rates Ei depend on the value of the angle
ψ. By symmetry, we can restrict ourselves to evaluate
the QBER in only one of the valid regions for ψ. Note
that is the same in all of them. For instance, let us
consider the case where ψ ∈ [7π/4 + Ω, π/4 − Ω] (which
corresponds to the horizontal polarization interval), and
let Eiψ denote the error rate of a signal σi,ψ in that region.
This quantity can be written as
Eiψ =
1
Qi
Tr
[(
Gl1 +
1
2
Gldc
)
σi,ψ
]
. (B7)
Here we have considered the typical initial post-
processing step in the BB84 protocol, where double-click
events are not discarded by Bob, but are randomly as-
signed to single-click events. Equation (B7) can be fur-
ther simplified as
Eiψ =
1
2Qi
{
ǫB(ǫB − 1)f i0,ψ + [2 + ǫB(ǫB − 3)]f i1,ψ
+ (1 − ǫB)2f idc,ψ + ǫB(2− ǫB)
}
, (B8)
where f ij,ψ = Tr
(
F ljσ
i
i,ψ
)
. After a short calculation, we
obtain
f i0,ψ =
1
piπ
∫
θξi
e−ηsysγ(θ)
[
− 1 + e 12 ηsysγ(θ)(1+cosψ)
]
dθ,
f i1,ψ =
1
piπ
∫
θξi
e−ηsysγ(θ)
[
− 1 + e 12 ηsysγ(θ)(1−cosψ)
]
dθ,
f idc,ψ = 1 +
1
piπ
∫
θξi
e−ηsysγ(θ) − e− 12ηsysγ(θ)(1−cosψ)
− e− 12 ηsysγ(θ)(1+cosψ) dθ. (B9)
When θΛ = π/2, these expressions can be simplified as
f s0,ψ = −A−(ηsysζ) +A−[κ+(ψ)], (B10)
fd0,ψ = −A+(ηsysζ) +A+[κ+(ψ)],
f s1,ψ = −A−(ηsysζ) +A−[κ−(ψ)],
fd1,ψ = −A+(ηsysζ) +A+[κ−(ψ)],
f sdc,ψ = 1 +A−(ηsysζ)−A−[ǫ+(ψ)]−A−[ǫ−(ψ)],
fddc,ψ = 1 +A+(ηsysζ) −A+[ǫ+(ψ)]−A+[ǫ−(ψ)],
where the parameters κ±(ψ) and ǫ±(ψ) have the form
κ±(ψ) = ηsysζ[1− (1 ± cosψ)/2],
ǫ±(ψ) = ηsysζ(1 ± cosψ)/2. (B11)
The quantum bit error rates Ei are then given by
Ei =
2
π − 4Ω
∫ pi
4
−Ω
7pi
4
+Ω
Eiψdψ. (B12)
Combining Eqs. (B8)-(B10-B12), we find that
Es =
1
2Qs
{
1− (1− ǫB)2A−(ηsysζ) + 2
π − 4Ω
∫ pi
4
−Ω
7pi
4
+Ω
ǫB(ǫB − 1)A−[κ+(ψ)] + [2 + ǫB(ǫB − 3)]A−[κ−(ψ)]
− (1− ǫB)2
[
A−[ǫ+(ψ)] +A−[ǫ−(ψ)]
]
dψ
}
,
(B13)
8and
Ed =
1
2Qd
{
1− (1− ǫB)2A+(ηsysζ) + 2
π − 4Ω
∫ pi
4
−Ω
7pi
4
+Ω
ǫB(ǫB − 1)A+[κ+(ψ)] + [2 + ǫB(ǫB − 3)]A+[κ−(ψ)]
− (1− ǫB)2
[
A+[ǫ+(ψ)] +A+[ǫ−(ψ)]
]
dψ
}
, (B14)
and we solve these equations numerically.
Appendix C: Estimation procedure
The secret key rate formula given by Eq. (13) can be
lower bounded by
Ri ≥ qpacc
{−Qif(Ei)H(Ei)+(pi1Y1+pi0Y0)[1−H(eU1 )]},
(C1)
where eU1 denotes an upper bound on the single-photon
error rate e1. Hence, for our purposes, it is enough to
obtain a lower bound on the quantities pi1Y1 + p
i
0Y0 for
all i ∈ {s, d}, together with eU1 . For that, we can directly
use the results obtained in Ref. [17], which we include
in this Appendix for completeness. The probabilities pin
given by Eq. (10) need to satisfy certain conditions that
we confirm numerically. In particular, we have that
pi1Y1 + p
i
0Y0 ≥ max
{
pi1(p
d
2Q
s − ps2Qd)
pd2p
s
1 − ps2pd1
+
[
pi0 − pi1
pd2p
s
0 − ps2pd0
pd2p
s
1 − ps2pd1
]
Y U0 , 0
}
, (C2)
where Y U0 denotes an upper bound on the background
rate Y0 given by
Y0 ≤ Y U0 = min
{
EdQd
pd0e0
,
EsQs
ps0e0
, 1
}
, (C3)
with e0 = 1/2. The single-photon error rate e1 can be
upper bounded as
e1 ≤ eU1 = min
{
EdQd − pd0Y L0 e0
pd1Y
L
1
,
EsQs − ps0Y L0 e0
ps1Y
L
1
,
ps0E
dQd − pd0EsQs
(pd1p
s
0 − ps1pd0)Y L1
}
, (C4)
where Y L1 and Y
L
0 represent, respectively, a lower bound
on the yield Y1 and the background rate Y0. These quan-
tities are given by
Y1 ≥ Y L1 = max
{
pd2Q
s − ps2Qd − (pd2ps0 − ps2pd0)Y U0
pd2p
s
1 − ps2pd1
, 0
}
,
(C5)
and
Y0 ≥ Y L0 = max
{
pd1Q
s − ps1Qd
pd1p
s
0 − ps1pd0
, 0
}
. (C6)
To evaluate these expressions we need the statistics
pin for n = 0, 1, 2. Using Eq. (10), and assuming again
θΛ = π/2, we obtain
ps0 = A−(ζ), (C7)
ps1 = ζ[A−(ζ)− e−ζ(I1,ζ − L−1,ζ)],
ps2 =
ζ
2
{
ζA−(ζ) + e−ζ
[ 2
π
(
1− ζ
2
3
)
+ (1 − 2ζ)(I1,ζ
− L−1,ζ) + ζ(I2,ζ − L2,ζ)
]}
,
and
pd0 = A+(ζ), (C8)
pd1 = ζ[A+(ζ) − e−ζ(I1,ζ + L−1,ζ)],
pd2 =
ζ
2
{
ζA+(ζ) + e
−ζ
[
− 2
π
(
1− ζ
2
3
)
+ (1 − 2ζ)(I1,ζ
+ L−1,ζ) + ζ(I2,ζ + L2,ζ)
]}
.
Appendix D: Asymptotic passive decoy-state BB84
transmitter
To evaluate the secret key rate formula given by
Eq. (12) in this scenario, we consider that ps ≈ 1, and we
assume that Alice and Bob can estimate the relevant pa-
rameters Y0, Y1, and e1 perfectly. Moreover, we use the
channel and detection models introduced in Appendix B.
In this situation, it turns out that the yields Y0 and Y1 are
given by Y0 = ǫB(2− ǫB) and Y1 = 1− (1− Y0)(1− ηsys).
The single-photon error rate e1 can be calculated us-
ing Eqs. (B8)-(B12) with σi,ψ = |1ψ〉〈1ψ|. After a short
calculation, we obtain
e1 =
1
2Y1
{
Y0 + (1− ǫB)2ηsys − 4(1− ǫB)ηsys
π − 4Ω
× sin
(
π
4
− Ω
)}
. (D1)
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is il-
lustrated in Fig. 3 (red line) for the optimized parameters
ζ and Ω.
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